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INTRODUCTION
Air and missile warfare is and will almost certainly continue to be a ubiquitous
aspect of contemporary armed conflicts. Yet, the law related to the regulation of this
aspect of warfare has failed to develop at the same pace as the methods and means of
employing such combat assets. The Manual on International Law Applicable to Air
and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual)' is therefore without question an important
development in the law of armed conflict. Although not hard law, it reflects the
consensus of some of the most respected jus in bello scholars in the world on how
existing law of armed conflict (LOAC) rules and norms apply to this type of warfare.
Understanding how air and missile warfare is planned, executed, and regulated
requires more than just an understanding of relevant LOAC provisions. In U.S.
practice (and that of many other countries), air and missile warfare is one piece of a
broader operational mosaic of law and military doctrine related to the joint targeting
process. According to U.S. doctrine, joint targeting involves:
creating specific effects to achieve the joint force commander's (JFC's)
objectives or the subordinate component commander's supporting
1. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN
POLICY AND
CONFLICr RESEARCH. MANUAL
ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE foreword (May 15, 2009), available

at http://ihlresearch.org/amwlHPCR%20Manual.pdf [hereinafter AMW MANUAL].
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objectives. Targeting proceeds from the definition of the problem to an
assessment of the results achieved by the executed courses of action. The
process allows for the testing of multiple solution paths, a thorough
understanding of the problem, and the refinement of proposed solutions.
The joint targeting process is flexible and adaptable to a wide range of
circumstances.2
Air and missile warfare is embedded within this broader targeting process.
Accordingly, a genuine understanding of the law of air and missile warfare
necessitates understanding how the LOAC influences and is integrated within this
targeting process.
How operational commanders select, attack, and assess potential targets and
how the LOAC reflects the logic of military doctrine related to this process is
therefore the objective of this Article. To achieve this objective, the authors focus on
a recent decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), Prosecutor v. Gotovina. Although the military operation at the center of
this case involved only limited use of air and missile warfare, the ICTY's extensive
focus on the use of artillery and rocket attacks provides a useful and highly relevant
illustration of why understanding the interrelationship between law and military
doctrine is essential for the logical and credible development of the law. The authors
therefore seek to "exploit" this case as an opportunity to expose the reader to this
interrelationship, an interrelationship equally essential to the effective evolution of
the law of air and missile warfare.

I.

BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2001, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia filed an indictment against Ante Gotovina, a former lieutenant
general of the Croatian Army, alleging a series of war crimes related to the execution
of "Operation Storm"' in 1995.' On its face, the indictment is not particularly
remarkable. As amended, it charged General Gotovina and two other former
Croatian generals with both individual and "joint criminal enterprise"' (JCE)

2. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60: JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING v (2002)
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter JP 3-60 (2002)]; see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION
3-60: JOINT TARGETING vii-ix (2007) [hereinafter JP 3-60 (2007)] (discussing the "Fundamentals of
Targeting").
3. Operation Storm is the code name given to a large-scale military operation carried out by Croatian
Armed Forces, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to gain control
of parts of Croatia that had been claimed by separatist ethnic Serbs since early 1991. For a description of
Operation Storm, see Mark Danner, Operation Storm, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1998, available at
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/50.
4. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-01-45-1, Indictment (May 21, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/ind/en/got-iiOlO6O8e.htm. The Prosecutor subsequently amended the
original indictment to name two additional Croatian former generals-Mladen Markac and Ivan Cermak.
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90, Amended Joinder Indictment (May 17, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/ind/en/got-amdjoind07O5l7e.pdf.
5. Joint criminal enterprise is a theory of criminal liability first recognized by the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, ICTY Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 18 (May 21, 2003). Like
conspiracy, JCE liability is a crime commission, characterized by the existence of a common criminal plan
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responsibility for, inter alia, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages. The
Prosecutor's central theory of criminal liability was an allegation that General
Gotovina's employment of indirect fires (such as artillery, rockets, and mortars)'
against population centers such as the city of Knin violated the LOAC.' While such
an allegation is not itself remarkable, the complex nature of the targeting situations
that existed during the attack on Knin and the reliance on these targeting decisions
as the focal point for criminal responsibility make this case profoundly significant in
the development of targeting law. Indeed, no other decision by the ICTY has
addressed such a complex targeting situation. For this reason, the attack on Knin
and the subsequent trial and conviction of General Gotovina offer a unique insight
into the law of targeting and its application in contemporary armed conflicts.
The ICTY convicted General Gotovina on April 15, 2011, sentencing him to
twenty-four years confinement.' This Article is not, however, focused on critiquing
that judgment.'o Instead, the issues raised in the trial of General Gotovina,
particularly with respect to the prosecution's novel theory that the mere use of
indirect fires against population centers violates the LOAC, provide an excellent lens
through which to examine the LOAC principles that regulate the application of
combat power and the processes by which military commanders synchronize
doctrine, law, and policy to employ force for mission accomplishment. The view
through this lens provides an important insight into a legal framework that is central
to the application of combat power in any context, including the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles armed with precision-guided missiles. In short, the complexities of the
legal issues related to the use of such weapons, like any weapons, must start with a
solid foundation of understanding the core principles of targeting, which are
illustrated by considering the complex case of the attack on Knin. The same LOAC
principles related to this attack are woven into the AMW Manual, and by viewing
them through the lens of an actual operation the authors hope to provide the reader
with an enhanced understanding of how the law is applied in actual operational
practice.
In the execution of military operations, commanders and their staffs conduct
detailed planning sessions in order to identify both the military end state that is to be

or purpose pursued by a plurality of persons. However, unlike conspiracy, JCE liability requires actual
commission by at least some of the members of the plurality of the underlying crimes agreed to; all
individuals who contribute to the carrying out of crimes in execution of a common purpose may be
subjected to criminal liability. Although not specifically recognized in the ICTY Statute, the Appeals
Chamber held that it is fairly encompassed within article 7(1) of the Statute. Id. para. 28.
6. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Amended Joinder Indictment, supra note 4, para. 51.
7. Indirect fire is "[flire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons
Indirect Fire Definition, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02:
or the director."
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 169 (Nov. 8, 2010, as

amended through Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter JP 1-02].
8. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90, Prosecution's Public Redacted Final Trial
Brief, para. 524-66 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom5/en/100802.pdf (describing
the "shelling" of Knin); Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90, Gotovina Defence Final Trial
Brief, para. 180 (July 27, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom5/en/100727.pdf (describing the
prosecution's theory of criminal liability).
9. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90, Judgement Volume II of II, para. 2620 (Apr. 15,
2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110415judgement-vol2.pdf.
10. The coauthors acknowledge Professor Geoffrey Corn's role as an expert witness for the defense
in the Gotovina trial. Professor Corn is also currently assisting with the filing of an amicus brief
challenging the trial court's findings.
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achieved and a construct for how to reach that end state. The commander is the
focal point of decision making throughout this process and during mission execution.
Every application of combat power, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic
level," is designed to achieve the specific effects that support the commander's
identified end state and objectives. These are the basic premises that drive the target
selection and execution process within a process characterized as operational art.
According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0:
Commanders use operational art to envision how to establish conditions
that define the desired end state. Actions and interactions across the levels
of war influence these conditions. These conditions are fundamentally
dynamic and linked together by the human dimension, the most
The operational
unpredictable and uncertain element of conflict.
environment is complex, adaptive, and interactive. Through operational
art, commanders apply a comprehensive understanding of it to determine

11.

According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations:
7-9. The strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group
of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.
Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence
initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national
power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide
military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans (JP 3-0).
7-12. The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state.
At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish
conditions that define that end state. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed
at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A
major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by
combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic
or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or
sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For
noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation (JP 30). Major operations are not solely the purview of combat forces. They are typically conducted
with the other instruments of national power. Major operations often bring together the
capabilities of other agencies, nations, and organizations.

7-16. Tactics uses and orders the arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through
tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander
uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit and crew actions. A battle consists
of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement.
Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An engagement is a tactical
conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 1-02). Engagements are
typically conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of
minutes, hours, or days.
7-17. Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical
operations. For any tactical-level operation, the surest measure of success is its contribution to
achieving end state conditions. Commanders avoid battles and engagements that do not
contribute to achieving the operational end state conditions.
U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS (2008) (amended Feb. 22, 2011) (emphasis in
original) [hereinafter FM 3-0].
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the most effective and efficient methods to influence conditions in various
locations across multiple echelons.12
Targeting is the term used within the military to describe the process of
applying combat power to achieve desired objectives within the overall operational
plan by destroying, disabling, degrading, or harassing enemy capabilities. 3 It
involves a cycle of identifying individuals and objects for potential attack, selecting
which of those objects will be attacked, selecting the means (weapons) and methods
(tactics) to conduct the attack, executing the attack, and assessing the effects of the
attack." All experts on the commander's staff (the "battle staff") participate in this
targeting process, whether deliberate or time-sensitive. At the most basic level,
operational experts identify the effects necessary to achieve the commander's
purpose, intelligence experts identify enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, weapon
systems experts identify the available assets capable of achieving the desired effects,
and the commander chooses the capability that he or she determines is best suited to
accomplish the mission. This process can be extremely complex and time consuming
at very high levels of command, or very brief and ad hoc at low levels of command.
Even an infantry fireteam-a group of four to eight soldiers-engages in this process.
The team leader identifies the objectives and employs the team's combat power in a
manner best designed to achieve those objectives. However, the process becomes
more complex in proportion to the level of command and the range of combat
capabilities available to the commander.
The commander's discretion in selecting targets for attack is not, however,
unfettered. In addition to being constrained by the mission and policy imperatives
dictated by his or her superiors, it is an axiom of military operations that the
commander may only direct attacks against lawful military objectives. What is or is
not lawful is defined by the LOAC, which provides the test for not only assessing
what people, places, and things may be attacked, but also for determining the legality
of the means and methods used for the attack. Therefore, a legal analysis is a
fundamental component of the target selection and engagement process. Stated
simply, the LOAC imposes on commanders (or any other operational decisionmaker) an obligation to ensure that persons, things, or places selected for deliberate
attack qualify as lawful military objectives, and that the means used to attack those
targets comply with limitations established by the LOAC." What qualifies as a
lawful military objective is determined by applying the controlling LOAC provisions
and definitions. Such definitions are found not only in binding LOAC treaties, but
also customary international law. In fact, in the context of contemporary armed
conflicts between states and non-state groups (such as terrorist organizations), it is

12. Id. para. 7-18.
13. See JP 1-02, supra note 7, at 354 (defining targeting as "[t]he process of selecting and prioritizing
targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and
capabilities").
14. Id.
15. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 52(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (defining military objectives and limiting attacks strictly to military
objectives); Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, para. 607 (May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj705O7JT2-e.pdf (explaining that the rule of "military
objective" applies to all armed conflicts as a matter of customary international law).
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this latter source of authority that establishes obligations applicable to all
belligerents, irrespective of the formal applicability of treaty obligations.
Because of the incredible complexity and pressure of combat, ensuring
compliance with the LOAC has proven to be one of the most challenging aspects of
conducting military operations. This complexity is invariably exacerbated in direct
relation to the unconventional nature of the opponent. However, the strategic
imperative of compliance with LOAC obligations is, if anything, increased in the
context of operations against such opponents, a reality emphasized by U.S. Army
doctrine:
Military leaders cannot dissociate objective from the related joint
principles of restraint and legitimacy, particularly in stability operations.
The amount of force used to obtain the objective must be prudent and
appropriate to strategic aims. Means used to accomplish the military
objective must not undermine the local population's willing acceptance of
a lawfully constituted government.
Without restraint or legitimacy,
support for military action deteriorates, and the objective becomes
unobtainable."
This doctrine is a direct reflection of the many lessons learned by military
commanders charged with achieving strategic objectives in the counter-insurgency
environment. As recent history demonstrates, the legitimacy of military operations
rests squarely, if not at times entirely, on the perception of adherence to the rule of
law, especially the LOAC.17
Thus, in many militaries around the world, military lawyers have assumed an
increasingly central role in the operational planning and target selection processes.
These lawyers are trained in the LOAC and embedded within the targeting process
to advise commanders on whether target selection and engagement will comport with
LOAC obligations.'8 However, it would be a major error to assume that lawyers will
always be involved in this process, and an even greater error to assume that lawyers
"own" this process. After all, even when the participants to a conflict are forces with
a commitment to providing widespread legal advice, the reality is quite different in
multiple ways. This is a reminder that while it is certainly beneficial that
commanders have access to such advice, it is only advice, and it is the commander
who is ultimately responsible for making the "shoot/don't shoot" judgment.
Lawyers never have been, and never should be, viewed as a substitute for this
decision-making obligation, even when highly skilled in both the LOAC and
operational art. The law, in short, must evolve and be articulated in a manner that

16. FM3-0,supra note 11, para. A-3.
17. See, e.g., Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not
Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REv. 1. 15-16 (Winter, 1994) ("Soldiers who spray fire when they should not do so
sabotage any operation in which the United States seeks to bolster the legitimacy of a government or
faction."); Susan L. Turley, Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?, 73 TEX. L. REV. 139, 143
(1994) ("Enforcing humane methods of combat establishes that a country is waging a justly fought war,
thus providing the best evidence to rebut propaganda claims of law-of-war violations.").
18. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'s LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S.
ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 130, 571 (2010) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK];
see also Additional Protocol 1, supra note 15, art. 82 ("The High Contracting Parties at all times ... shall
ensure that legal advisors are available, when necessary..I.").
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facilitates its understanding by lay commanders, for it is their judgment that the law
must inform. While the AMW Manual is an important contribution to this evolution,
the regulation of air and missile warfare operations must be driven by a synchronized
assessment of both legal norms and operational realities. Allowing the law to
develop without consideration of operational reality will undermine its ultimate
efficacy because the constituents who must embrace the law will view it as
inconsistent with their operational instincts.
Why is this so in an era of increasing legal primacy in LOAC development?
First, there will always be levels of command without immediate access to legal
advisors. The bulk of combat occurs at the tactical, small-unit level, where military
lawyers are rarely-if ever-available. Second, while an ideal targeting decision
would be the product of a deliberate planning process, armed conflict is actually
laden with dynamic and emergent targeting decisions that are made without the
benefit of prior planning and analysis. Belligerents make these decisions in situations
offering extremely limited time to contemplate the action, much less seek the advice
of a military lawyer. Indeed, U.S. Marine Corps doctrine indicates that:
Marines must determine if a situation warrants applying deadly force.
Sometimes Marines must decide in a matter of seconds because their lives
or the lives of others depend on their actions. To make the right decision,
Marines must understand both the lethal and nonlethal close combat
techniques needed to handle the situation responsibly without escalating
the violence unnecessarily."
In reality, even seconds will often be a luxury for the war fighter.
Even an infantry private deciding to engage an enemy belligerent is
implementing LOAC principles in a real-time targeting process. And all soldiers
learn as soon as they enter a combat environment what the Federal Bureau of
Investigation emphasizes when training its agents on the use of deadly force: action
nearly always beats reaction. 20 Hesitation during the assessment phase of the
immediate engagement decision cycle can mean the difference between life or death
and mission success or failure. Even during deliberate planning, the compressed
time lines of combat often do not afford the luxury of time that is needed to
thoroughly analyze the legal nuances of each contemplated action. As such,
commanders and their staffs (including military legal advisors), as well as the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that execute military missions, depend on
simplified systems that make the integration of law into operational planning and
execution routine. These systems-all of which must effectuate the synchronization
of law and operations (sometimes referred to as "operationalizing" the law")transform the complex rules and principles of the LOAC into digestible,
understandable, trainable, and easily applicable concepts.
Of course, "operationalizing" the law necessitates an understanding of the
relationship between the law and the principles of military operations that the law

19. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, MCRP 3-02B, CLOSE COMBAT foreword
(1999).
20. Anthony J. Pinizzotto et al., Law Enforcement Perspective on the Use of Force: Hands-on,
Experimental Training for Prosecuting Attorneys, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 16, 18 (Apr. 2009),
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2009-pdfs/april091eb.pdf.
21. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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regulates. With respect to targeting specifically, it requires an appreciation of the
targeting process, the capabilities of the assets to be employed, and the anticipated
effects of employment. It also requires an appreciation of how LOAC targeting
principles impact all of these considerations. This is rarely more significant than
when analyzing the legality of employing indirect fires during combat operations.
Indirect fires-which include weapons such as cannon and rocket artillery, mortars,
naval gunfire, and missiles -display two characteristics that make its employment
particularly challenging from a LOAC perspective: enhanced destructive power and
non-line-of-sight engagement.
In many ways, indirect fire support-the use of indirect fires to directly support
land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces,
combat formations, and facilities 22 is the quintessential example of how the LOAC
influences the employment of combat power. This is especially the case because it
has become almost inevitable that civilians or civilian property will be in close
proximity to targets that are identified for attack with indirect fires. This realitycombined with the enhanced destructive effects of most indirect fire weapons, the
limits on information available to commanders who use such fires, and the risk that
such fires will produce effects that extend beyond the intended object of attackindicates that integrating LOAC targeting principles into the planning and execution
of fire support missions is essential to the legitimate use of such fires.
The purpose of this Article is therefore to illustrate this synchronization process
through the example of Operation Storm. As background, Part II will describe
Operation Storm, focusing specifically on the Croat use of indirect fires in and
around the city of Knin." The Article then turns in Part III to a broader discussion
of the role that LOAC targeting principles play in this process of synchronization,
starting with an explanation of the target planning and execution process itself.24
From there, the Article considers a series of questions in order to explore the
relationship between the LOAC and the logic of military operations. It then explains
the relationship between the LOAC, rules of engagement, and the targeting
processes. Next, it specifically addresses the application of these principles to the use
of indirect fires in areas of civilian population, including a discussion of the risks of
conducting ground maneuvers in such populated areas and how this risk impacts a
commander's choice to employ indirect fires. The Article concludes with several
general considerations related to the obligations and expectations of commanders
engaged in the target decision-making process.

22. JP 1-02, supra note 7, at 133.
23. While this Article does not address the specific target set and engagement missions approved by
General Gotovina, using the questions solicited by his defense will hopefully offer readers a more
complete understanding of LOAC targeting principles in action.
24. These tenets are based on an opinion originally written by Professor Corn in his capacity as an
expert witness for the defense in Prosecutorv. Gotovina. Central to the prosecution's theory of criminal
responsibility in this case was the allegation that General Gotovina employed indirect fire assets-to
include rocket artillery- against the city of Knin in the Serb-controlled area of Croatia (the Krajina) in
order to terrorize the civilian population. In response to this allegation, General Gotovina's defense
sought to establish why the use of these assets during Operation Storm-the offensive commanded by
General Gotovina to liberate the Krajina from the control of dissident Croatian Serb forces-was
legitimate within the parameters of the LOAC.
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OPERATION STORM AND THE USE OF INDIRECT FIRES

By the mid-summer of 1995, armed hostilities triggered by the fragmentation of
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were raging in Bosnia
and Croatia.2 5 In Croatia, this violence began in 1991 when the Croat-Serb majority
in and around Knin established the Serbian Autonomous Oblast (SAO) of Krajina.2 6
The SAO declared itself independent of Croatia on March 16, 1991.27 In 1992,
following Croatia's declaration of independence from the SFRY, the SAO united
with other self-declared SAOs to form the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
As the conflict widened into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the
breakaway Krajina Serbs remained in a state of armed conflict. In 1995, responding
to failed negotiations between the warring parties, and building on recent battlefield
successes, Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman met with his top military and political
leaders to begin planning a decisive operation against the Krajina Serb forces.29 The
name chosen for the offensive was Operation Storm.30
On August 4, 1995, Croatian military forces launched Operation Storm-the
largest ground offensive in Europe since World War II-with the objective of
retaking the Krajina region." The four-day offensive opened with 150,000 Croatian
forces attacking along a 300-kilometer front.32 Not surprisingly, long-range artillery
fires were integrated into all phases of the operation." In many instances, Croatian
forces employed these indirect fires against predetermined enemy objectives located
in the city of Knin and other population centers, a fact which figured prominently in
Prosecutorv. Gotovina."

In terms of achieving the objective of reestablishing Croatian control over the
Krajina, Operation Storm was a complete success. The Serb forces were quickly
defeated in depth and the operation reversed the military balance of power in the
region." This shift in power eventually led to the resumption of peace talks and the

25. JUDITH ARMATTA, TWILIGHT OF IMPUNITY 124, 468 (2010) (time line of events surrounding the
hostilities in the former SFRY).
26. Chuck Sudetic, Serbian Enclave Reluctant to Allow Visit by Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1991,
at A4.
27. David Binder, Serbian Official Declares Part of CroatiaSeparate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at
A3.
28. ARMATTA, supra note 25, at 484-85.
29. See CroatianSerbs Won't Even Look at Plan for Limited Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at
A3 ("A proposal described as the last best effort to avoid a much wider Balkan war was spurned late
today by leaders of the Serbian nationalists who control a third of Croatia."); CroatianPresident Franjo
Tudjman Says Force Was the Only Option to Shift the Balance of Power in the Balkans Away from the
Serbs, CNN WORLD (Aug. 29, 1995), http://articles.cnn.com/1995-08-29/world/Bosnia-updates august95
8-19_tudjmanloperation-storm-krajina-serbs-forces (stating that the Croatian Army's "successful
military offensive" allowed Croatia to reclaim lands held by Krajina Serbs for four years).
30. Danner, supra note 3.
31. Id.; Anes Alic, Serb NGOs Sue US Private Security Outfit for 'Genocide' in Croatia,ISA INTEL
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.isaintel.com/2011/09/21.
32. Alic, supra note 31.
33. Croatia- Operation Storm 1995, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops
/croatia.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (describing the attack as including "integrated air, artillery, and
infantry movements").
34. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90, Judgment Volume I of II, paras. 1163-281
(Apr. 15,2011), http://www.icty.orglxlcases/gotovinaltjuglen/110415judgement-voll.pdf.
35. See Danner, supra note 3 ("[L]ess than three months after Tudjman launched his 'Operation

2012]

THE LAW OF OPERATIONAL TARGETING

347

Dayton Accords a few months later. However, another immediate consequence of
the offensive was the near complete displacement of the Krajina-Serb populationsome 150,000 people or more." The question of whether this mass exodus was the
result of deliberate ethnic cleansing or an unintended consequence of legitimate
military operations was at the heart of the Prosecutor's case and General Gotovina's
conviction.3 8
At the macro level, Prosecutor v. Gotovina rests on the allegation of a "joint
criminal enterprise [JCE]; the common purpose being the permanent removal of the
Serb population from the Krajina region by force, fear or threat of force,
persecution, forced displacement, transfer and deportation, appropriation and
destruction of property or other means . . . ."'

As set forth in the prosecution's

Public Redacted Final Trial Brief, its theory of JCE liability was premised in large
part on a number of alleged LOAC violations-a "[f]orcible [d]isplacement through
the [c]omission of (c]rimes,"4 0 to include the unlawful use of artillery against Knin
and other population centers."
According to the prosecution, the defendants furthered their JCE through the
use of artillery to either directly or indiscriminately target civilians and civilian
property, thus violating the LOAC principles regulating the employment of combat
power.42 The defense countered that the defendants' employment of indirect fires
during Operation Storm was based on accepted military doctrine and that such
indirect fires were directed only at lawful military objectives."3 Accordingly, the
defense position was that the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that General Gotovina violated relevant LOAC principles; indeed, the defense
asserted that the prosecution's own facts established General Gotovina's compliance
with those principles, particularly when considered within the broader context of the

Storm'-the Serbs had lost enough territory to bring their holdings from 70 percent to not more than
half .... ).
36. JAMES Gow, TRIUMPH OF THE LACK OF WILL: INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE
YUGOSLAV WAR 276-77 (1997).
37. ROBERTA COHEN & FRANCIS MADING DENG, THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES OF THE
INTERNALLY DISPLACED 185 (1998) (describing the incident as leading to the "mass migration of nearly
150,000 civilian[s] and 50,000 soldiers from the Krajina region").
38. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgement Volume II of II, supra note 9, paras. 2600-01 (describing
the manner in which the attack had been planned as deliberate).
39. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Amended Joinder Indictment, supra note 4, para. 12.
40. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Prosecution's Public Redacted Final Trial Brief, supra note 8, para.
I(C(1); see also id. para. I(A)(1) ("The Accused and other Joint Criminal Enterprise ('JCE') members
shared the common criminal purpose of the JCE to permanently remove the Serb population from the
Krajina region by force or threat of force, including through the commission of the following crimes
charged in Counts 1-5 of the Indictment: persecution (through deportation and forcible transfer, wanton
destruction, plunder, shelling of civilians, unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the imposition
of restrictive and discriminatory measures including the imposition of discriminatory laws and
discriminatory expropriation of property, and unlawful detentions); deportation and forcible transfer;
plunder; and wanton destruction." (footnote omitted)).
41. Id. paras. 615-31. According to the prosecution, the "shelling" of Knin and other areas was the
manifestation of an agreement between then President Franjo Tudjman and senior Croat leaders,
including Gotovina and the other defendants, at a meeting on the island of Brijuni on July 31, 1995. Id.
para. 127.
42. Id. para. 491.
43. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Gotovina Defence Final Trial Brief, supra note 8, paras. 180-88.
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overall offensive.44 At trial, the defense sought to establish that General Gotovina
employed indirect fires only against targets that qualified as lawful objects of attack
in accordance with the LOAC principle of distinction. 45 These attacks on Serb forces
were designed to (and in fact did) disrupt enemy command, control, and
communication capabilities, as well as its logistical support, while also degrading the
enemy's willingness to fight.
The applicability of fundamental LOAC targeting principles-distinction,
proportionality, and precautions in the attack-was never disputed between the
parties. Nor do the authors take issue with their applicability to Operation Storm.
The principle of distinction prohibits deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian
objects. 47 Indiscriminate attacks-attacks on a lawful object that are anticipated to
produce collateral damage or incidental injury that is excessive in relation to the
legitimate anticipated value of the attacks-are also prohibited by the LOAC.48
Precautions in the attack require that commanders utilize feasible measures for the
purpose of mitigating the risk to the civilian population (such as issuing warnings or
timing the attack to minimize civilian exposure). 49 However, the assessment of
whether the use of indirect fires during a particular military operation violates these
LOAC principles must always turn on an assessment of the specific facts available to
the commander at the time he orders the attack, not on a retrospective view
considering facts and circumstances that were not available to the commander. This
analytical perspective is central to the credibility of any post-attack criminal or
administrative review of a commander's judgments and is at the core of the
controversy over the execution of Operation Storm.
Perspective, however, was not the only area of dispute between the prosecution
and defense. As indicated by the opposing trial briefs in the Gotovina case, the issue
of the lawful employment of indirect fires during Operation Storm is subject to a
number of disputed material facts.o However, irrespective of the relative merits of
each position, there is a clear dispute as to the correct interpretation of the
controlling LOAC principles. The prosecution strongly implied a per se prohibition
on the use of indirect fires in population centers. The defense countered this position
by arguing that no such prohibition exists and that targeting military objectives in a
populated area must be analyzed no differently than any other targeting decisionby applying LOAC principles within the context of the operational situation." The
Trial Chamber appears to have rejected the per se prohibition theory.52 Nonetheless,
the Chamber's judgment of conviction in many ways endorsed a near strict liability
standard of care for the employment of indirect fires in populated areas, condemning

44. Id. paras. 180-319.
45. Id. para. 258 (listing specific military objectives that were identified during the targeting process
and the justification for their selection).
46. Id.
47. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51-52 (stating that civilians and civilian objects
"shall not be the object of attack").
48. Id. arts. 51(2), (4), (5).
49. Id. art. 57(2).
50. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
51. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Gotovina Defence Final Trial Brief, supra note 8, paras. 260-88.
52. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgement Volume II of II, supra note 9, paras. 1893-913 (finding
liability through rigorous factual analysis of artillery attack).
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General Gotovina based on a very small percentage of artillery effects that could not
(at least according to the Chamber) be attributed to lawful objects of attack."
How the LOAC influenced the planning, execution, and criminal critique of
Operation Storm offers a particularly relevant opportunity to understand the
relationship of law and targeting doctrine. This Article will hopefully provide greater
insight into this relationship, the importance of which transcends Operation Storm
and applies to any effort to genuinely understand how the LOAC impacts the
employment of deadly combat power.

III.

OPERATIONALIZING THE LAW: INTEGRATING AND
APPLYING THE LOAC IN TARGETING

Although a relatively novel term, "operationalize" is generally defined as: to
make operational; put into operation. As noted above, in the context of military
operations, putting the LOAC "into operation" involves transforming the myriad
complex rules and principles of the LOAC into understandable and actionable
orders and guidance for commanders and soldiers" at every echelon. It is to this
process of LOAC integration and application that the Article now turns, starting
with a brief description of the targeting process itself. 6
A.

The Targeting Process

In common parlance, a target is "something or someone fired at or marked for
attack."" In military terms, the United States defines target as:
[A]n entity or object considered for possible engagement or action. It may
be an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function,
individual, group, system, entity, or behavior identified for possible
action .....

Targets relate to objectives at all levels of war. Whether a target is selected through
a deliberate planning process or identified as an emergent opportunity, it should be
selected and engaged in support of the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.

53. See id. para. 1909 ("The Trial Chamber considers that the number of civilian objects or areas in
Knin deliberately fired at ... may appear limited in view of the total of at least 900 projectiles fired at the
town on 4 and 5 August 1995.").
54. Operationalize Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
operationalize?q=operationalize (last visited Feb. 22,2012).
55. We use the term "soldier" throughout this Article to refer to a member of the armed forces. We
are fully cognizant of the fact that "soldier" normally indicates a member of the Army, and not a member
of the Navy (Sailor), Air Force (Airman), or Marine Corps (Marine). However, we use this term for
purposes of simplicity and not in an effort to diminish the differences between each branch of the armed
forces.

56.

Although the description that follows is based primarily on U.S. doctrine, the basic structure is

See generally NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY, ALLIED JOINT
shared by most militaries.
PUBLICATION 3.9: ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING (2008) (describing NATO targeting
doctrine).
57.

Target Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1206 (10th ed. 1993).

58.

JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at I-1.
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Of course, it is axiomatic that only those targets determined to be valid military
objectives, as defined in the LOAC, are to be made the subject of attack.5 9
Targeting is "the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and
capabilities." 60 The targeting process
defines what targets are to be engaged, by which assets, using which
method and in which priority order. It also specifies targets that are
restricted or may not be engaged at all. Above all, the process aims to
ensure all involved are entirely clear about their targeting and
coordination responsibilities and constraints, in time and space."
Before turning to the governing LOAC principles that are applicable to this process,
it is necessary to first describe the process itself, focusing on those steps in the
process where the injection of proper legal analysis is most critical.
Although doctrine and terminology may differ among militaries, certain core
concepts are common to all. Whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level of
warfare, the ultimate objective of any military commander is to employ his or her
available capabilities in a synchronized manner to successfully achieve a defined end
state as efficiently and effectively as possible. In warfare, this involves leveraging
available assets to generate combat power to achieve a desired effect at the selected
time and place. By virtue of their extended range and amplified destructive power,
indirect fires have long been considered and utilized as a critical component of
combat power.
To assist commanders with integrating, synchronizing, and directing operations,
doctrine organizes all available capabilities into six basic operational functions:
command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and
sustainment.6 2 Commanders generate and apply combat power through the correct
application of each of these six functions. While the relative weight of each function
may vary according to each mission, the fires function is often critical to executing
the commander's overall concept of operations, whether the nature of the operation
is offensive or defensive. This is true regardless of whether indirect fires are
employed to enhance the overall effect of the other functions (such as maneuver and
movement) or to create and preserve conditions for the success of the operation
itself.
Fires are defined as "[t]he use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or
nonlethal effects on a target."63 As a war-fighting function, fires consist of the related
tasks and systems that provide the coordinated use of surface-to-surface indirect
fires, air-to-surface fires (which would include drone operations), naval surface fires,
and command and control of these assets through the targeting process." Fires

59.
60.
61.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 52.
JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at I-1.
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY, ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION 3(B):
ALLIED JOINT
DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS para. 0448 (2011).
62. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0: JOINT OPERATIONS III-1 (2011) [hereinafter
JP 3-0].

63. JP 1-02, supra note 7, at 133.
64. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-60:
[hereinafter FM 3-60].

THE TARGETING PROCESS 1-1 to -2 (2010)
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include all tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of these
types of fires with each other and with the effects of the other war fighting
functions.'
As part of the commander's integrated plan, fires can be employed for a variety
of purposes. Among the more common purposes, fires are employed to: provide fire
support to assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move,
maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters; interdict
enemy capabilities to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential
before it can be used effectively against friendly forces; attack strategic objectives
and centers of gravity; and counter air and missile threats, to name a few.
Commanders ensure the effective integration and synchronization of fires into their
plans through the use of standard target selection and execution processes that seek
to link intelligence, plans, and operations across all levels of command.
Targeting is a cyclical and iterative process requiring constant flexibility and
adaptability in order to respond to the dynamic nature of operations. At the most
basic level, it involves planning, execution, and assessment of the efficacy of each
engagement or attack. The targeting cycle can be further broken down into six
phases, represented in the figure below.'

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE

:7(

4.

ComaneI

65. See JP 3-0, supra note 62, at Ill-1 ("The joint functions reinforce and complement one another,
and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment.").
66. JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at 11-3.
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The intersection of mission imperatives, policy considerations, and the law is
constantly at play during all six phases of the targeting cycle. Commanders, planners,
and, when available, legal advisors must be cognizant of these factors at all times.
The legal analysis begins with the identification of the commander's end state and
objectives and carries through the entire process to the assessment and related
recommendations for reengagement.6' There are certain points in the process,
however, where legal analysis is most critical to the commander's decision making.
During the deliberate (as opposed to time-sensitive) target development and
prioritization phase, legal advisors normally review every proposed target. This
target vetting or validation process is intended to ensure compliance with applicable
rules of engagement (ROE), the LOAC, or any other specific restrictions such as NoStrike or Restricted Target lists." As discussed more fully below, the LOAC sets the
legal limits for defining and engaging lawful targets, while ROE serve as an
additional source of authority defining guidelines for permissible combat actions.69
Accordingly, ROE limitations must be consistent with the LOAC, but they are
technically not law. Instead, they are constraints based on mission imperatives and
policy considerations, under which forces may initiate or continue combat
engagement."
Once targets are vetted and validated, they are nominated for approval." It is at
the next stage that the commander and staff engage in the detailed analysis of
available capabilities in relation to desired effects. This process of "weaponeering"
is heavily impacted by the LOAC principle of proportionality.7 ' The commander and
planners seek to mitigate the risk of collateral damage by selecting weapons and
tactics that will, to the greatest feasible extent, produce the desired effect while
limiting such collateral damage." This selection process is thoroughly consistent with
the LOAC, and, of equal importance, it is also consistent with operational logic.
Commanders gain no benefit from wasting effects, and they therefore logically seek
to maximize effects on the intended objects of attack."
However, it is important to note that this does not mean commanders will
always select the weapon that produces the minimum collateral damage. The
mitigation of such damage, while an important consideration in the weaponeering
process, is not the exclusive consideration. Factors such as weapon availability,
resupply rates, potential future requirements, and risk to friendly forces all play into

Id. at 11-3 to -19.
Id. at 11-4, 11-8, 111-10.
JP 1-02, supra note 7, at 309; see also CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION,
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES (2005)
("The [Standing Rules of Engagement] establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the
actions to be taken by U.S. commanders during all military operations and contingencies...."), reprinted
in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 87.
70. See generally OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 73-81 (providing an "overview
of basic ROE concepts").
71. JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at 11-9.
72. Id. at 11-10-11.
73. See, e.g., UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND, JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING HANDBOOK
111-69 to -79 (2007) [hereinafter JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING HANDBOOK] (discussing weaponeering
and the Collateral Damage Estimation process).
74. JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at 11-10 to -11.
75. JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 1-3.
67.
68.
69.
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this process." Thus, it is not uncommon for commanders to forego a means or
method of attack that might create the least amount of collateral damage risk in
favor of an alternative that creates greater risk. But such a decision will be driven by
the prioritization of one of these other considerations. For example, while use of a
drone attack might offer the most precise method of target engagement and
therefore create the lowest level of collateral damage risk, that option might not be
feasible in certain situations, such as those involving robust enemy air defense
systems or limited supply of drone assets. In such situations, even if the commander
could use the drone, he might select an alternate means of attack in order to
"husband" the drone resource.
However, there does come a point where the LOAC dictates the weaponeering
decision. The LOAC principle of proportionality prohibits the selection of any
means or method of attack anticipated to produce collateral damage or incidental
injury that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." Accordingly, even if a proposed attack option will achieve the desired
effect against a presumptively lawful military objective, it may not be utilized if the
commander believes it will produce such an excessive effect. This is reflected in U.S.
Joint Targeting doctrine, which indicates that "[c]ollateral damage estimation
(CDE) is a critical component of the ... targeting process.""
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that the effective
integration and synchronization of the LOAC into and throughout the targeting
process requires far more than a basic familiarity with the applicable treaty and
customary norms. The LOAC is an elaborate set of rules developed from a desire
among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruction in warfare.
At the same time, the LOAC recognizes that under certain circumstances states have
the need and the right to wage war. The law therefore seeks to strike a balance
between humanitarian protections and the legitimate imperatives of warfare.
Understanding this balance and the complex interaction among law, policy, and
military doctrine is critical to the effective integration of legal advice into the
targeting process. Before discussing the LOAC provisions relevant to the targeting
process, a brief description of the concept of rules of engagement and their
relationship to the LOAC is warranted.
B. The Relationship Between the LOAC and Rules of Engagement
It is axiomatic that thorough understanding of the military end state and the
commander's intent, objectives, desired effects, and required tasks drives the entire
targeting process. However, if the end state and objectives are tainted in any way
with an improper or illegal purpose, or if they are premised on a misinterpretation of
the legal authorities at the foundation of the overall operation, then the engagement
of every target is at risk of legal infirmity. Accordingly, it is at this critical stage that

76. Id. at 111-72 to -73.
77. JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at E-1; see also Additional Protocol 1, supranote 15, art.57(2)(a)(iii)
(requiring parties to a conflict to "refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated").
78. JP 3-60 (2007), supra note 2, at 11-10.
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legal considerations inform the development of combat force initiation procedures as
well as employment restraints or constraints. In U.S. practice (and the practice of
many other states), these procedures and constraints normally take the form of rules
of engagement. 9 Whether during the ROE development process or during the
planning and execution of operations within an established ROE framework, legal
advisors play a crucial role in ensuring the legality, and hence the legitimacy, of the
application of combat power.
The ROE and the LOAC are two distinct sources of operational regulation.
While ROE will often incorporate LOAC obligations and authorities, they are not
synonymous. As defined in U.S. military doctrine, ROE are "[d]irectives issued by
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with
other forces encountered."" In other words, ROE are intended to give operational
and tactical military leaders greater control over the execution of combat operations
by subordinate forces. Though not historically designated in contemporary terms,
the history of warfare is replete with examples of what have essentially been ROE.
The Battle of Bunker Hill provides what is perhaps a quintessential example of such
use. Captain William Prescott imposed a limitation on the use of combat power by
his forces in the form of the directive "[d]on't one of you shoot until you see the
whites of their eyes" in order to accomplish a tactical objective.8 Given his limited
resources against a much larger and better-equipped foe, he used this tactical control
measure to maximize the effect of his firepower. This example of what was in effect
a rule of engagement is remembered to this day for one primary reason-it enabled
the American rebels to maximize enemy casualties.
Another modern example of tactical controls on the use of force is the Battle of
Naco in the fall of 1914. The actual battle was between two Mexican factions, but it
occurred on the border with the United States. 82 In response to the threat of crossborder incursions, the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, stationed at Fort Huachuca,
Arizona, were deployed to the U.S. side of the border to ensure U.S. neutrality was
strictly maintained.- As part of the cavalry mission, "[t]he men were under orders
not to return fire,"' despite the fact that the U.S. forces were routinely fired upon
and "[t]he provocation to return the fire was very great." Because of the soldiers'
tactical restraint and correct application of their orders-what today would be
characterized as rules of engagement-the strategic objective of maintaining U.S.
neutrality was accomplished without provoking a conflict between the Mexican
factions and the United States. The level of discipline reflected by the actions of
these U.S. forces elicited a special letter of commendation from the President and the
Chief of Staff of the Army.
79. JP 1-02, supra note 7, at 309. In the context of joint operations planning, rule of engagement is a
requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates (restraint) or prohibits
(constraint) an action, thus restricting freedom of action.
80. Id.
81. JOHN BARTLETI, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 353 (13th ed. 1955).
82. James P. Finley, Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The Battle of Naco, 1 HUACHUCA ILLUSTRATED,
1993, available at http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/huachuca/HI1-10.htm.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Colonel William C. Brown).
86. Id. (A military chronicler noted that the Chief of Staff's Annual Report stated: "These troops
were constantly under fire and one was killed and 18 were wounded without a single case of return fire of
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Despite these and numerous other historical examples of soldiers applying
ROE, the actual term "rules of engagement" was not used in the United States until
1958 by the military's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)." As the Cold War began to heat
up and the United States had military forces spread across the globe, military leaders
were anxious to control the application of force and to ensure that any force used
complied with national strategic policies.' With U.S. and Soviet bloc forces looking
at each other across fences and walls in Europe and over small areas of air and water
in the skies and oceans, it was important to prevent a local commander's
overreaction to a situation that might begin as a minor insult or probe from resulting
in the outbreak of a conflict that could quickly escalate into World War III.
Accordingly, in 1981 the JCS produced a document titled the JCS Peacetime ROE
for Seaborne Forces, which was subsequently expanded in 1986 into the JCS
Peacetime ROE for all U.S. Forces.8 ' Then, at the end of the Cold War, the JCS
reconsidered their peacetime ROE and determined that the document should be
amended to apply to all situations, including war and military operations other than
war.90 In 1994, they promulgated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing
ROE that was subsequently updated in 2000 and again in 2005." As discussed below
in detail, it is this 2005 edition that governs the actions of U.S. military members
today.
ROE have become a key issue in modern warfare" and a key component of
mission planning for U.S. and many other armed forces." In preparation for military
operations, the President and/or Secretary of Defense personally review and approve
the ROE, ensuring they meet the military and political objectives. 94 Ideally, ROE
represent the confluence of three important factors: operational requirements,
national policy, and the law of armed conflict.95 This is illustrated by the diagram
below."

retaliation. This is the hardest kind of service and only troops in the highest state of discipline would stand
such a test.").
87. TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE INUN PEACE OPERATIONS 14 n.26 (2002).
88. See generally Robert K. Fricke, Dereliction of Duty, 160 MIL. L. REv. 248 (1990) (book review).
89. Martins, supra note 17, at 42.
90. International Law Note, "Land Forces" Rules of Engagement Symposium: The CLAMO Revises
the Peacetime Rules of Engagement, 27-50-253 ARMY LAW. 48, 49 (Dec. 1993).
91. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 74 (noting the effective date of June 13,
2005, and how the Joint Chiefs of Staff replaced the 2000 and 1994 orders).
92. See, e.g., Sean McCormack, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/oct/93190.htm (discussing ROE in relation to the Blackwater
private security defense contractor).
93. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 83 (discussing ROE's importance in
mission accomplishment); CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

HANDBOOK FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 1-1 to -32 (2000) (discussing ROE development).
94. See Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REV.
126, 126 (1998) (discussing how the "national command authority [reviews ROE] in accordance with
exacting politico-legal imperatives").
95. Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42
A.F. L. REV. 245, 247 (1997).
96.

Martins, supra note 17, at 26.
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It is particularly important to note that while ROE are not coterminous with the
law of armed conflict, they must be completely consistent with this law. In other
words, while there are provisions of the LOAC that do not affect a mission's ROE,
all ROE must comply with the LOAC. This is illustrated by the diagram above,
which reflects the common situation where the authority provided by the ROE is
more limited than would be consistent with the law of armed conflict. For example,
in order to provide greater protection against collateral injury to civilians, the ROE
may require that the engagement of a clearly defined military objective in a
populated area be authorized only when the target is under direct observation. This
is a fundamental principle and key to the proper formation and application of ROE.
In fact, the preeminent U.S. ROE order explicitly directs U.S. forces that they "will
comply with the Law of Armed Conflict during military operations involving armed
conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized under international law,
and will comply with the principles and spirit of the Law of Armed Conflict during all
other operations." 7 Note that this directive applies to "armed conflict," not
international armed conflict.
To illustrate this interaction between ROE and the LOAC, consider an ROE
provision that allows a soldier to kill an enemy. While this provision is completely
appropriate, it does not give the soldier the authority to kill an enemy who is
surrendering because such conduct would violate the LOAC." Similarly, if the ROE
allow a pilot to destroy a bridge with a bomb, that does not relieve the pilot of the
97. OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at A-1.
98. AMW MANUAL, supra note 1, r. 15(b): see also Turley, supra note 17, at 145 (describing the
humanitarian and strategic motivations underlying the protection of surrendering soldiers).
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responsibility to do a proportionality analysis and be certain that any incidental
civilian deaths or damage to civilian property is not "excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage" to be gained by the destruction of the
bridge." ROE will often contain provisions that remind soldiers that they can only
engage the enemy or other individuals who engage in defined conduct endangering
soldiers or others.'O In this way, ROE ensures compliance with the laws of war by
reinforcing the requirement to abide by the LOAC.
Recognizing this interrelationship is therefore essential to understanding why
violation of a constraint imposed by a specific ROE, or even customarily imposed by
ROE, does not ipso facto establish violation of the LOAC. To assess that question, it
is necessary to determine whether the ROE constraint was coterminous with the
LOAC or more restrictive than the scope of permissible authority established by the
LOAC. In contemporary military operations, it is common for ROE to be more
restrictive than the LOAC in order to satisfy policy considerations related to the
application of combat power. This is particularly true with regard to the employment
of indirect fires. 01

IV.

UNDERSTANDING THE SYMMETRY BETWEEN THE
AND OPERATIONAL ART

LOAC

As noted in the foregoing discussion, LOAC regulation and operational art are
inextricably intertwined. Even the most thorough understanding of one of these
disciplines is insufficient to appreciate genuinely how the law influences the planning
and execution of military operations. Instead, such an appreciation is derived from
an understanding of the relationship between these two disciplines or, perhaps more
importantly, the symmetry between LOAC regulation and operational
considerations.
During the trial of General Gotovina, both the prosecution and defense sought
to provide evidence on this interrelationship. Experts on the impact of LOAC
regulation on the targeting process testified for both the prosecution and defense,
offering their assessments of how the LOAC impacted General Gotovina's
obligations within the context of the operational situation he confronted.'? Both
experts agreed that for General Gotovina, like any other operational commander,
compliance with LOAC obligations was central to the legitimate use of fires, and
However, there was substantial disagreement on
ultimately to mission success.'
how the operational situation impacted application of LOAC targeting principles.""

99. Additional Protocol 1,supra note 15, art. 57.2(b).
100. See, e.g., CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATION, supra note 93, at B-15-25 (providing an
example ROE card).
101. For example, a typical rule of engagement might restrict the use of indirect fires in populated
areas when direct observation of the target is not available, such as from a Forward Observer. While no
such rule exists in the LOAC, requiring direct observation provides an added degree of confidence that
the target is in fact a legitimate military objective, that any collateral effects will be within legal and
acceptable standards, and that the rounds will impact the intended target.
102. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgement Volume I of II, supra note 34, paras. 1163-75 (summarizing
expert testimony).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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In order to facilitate a general understanding of this aspect of the case, the
Gotovina defense proffered a series of questions focused on how an operational
situation influences implementation of these LOAC targeting principles.'os The
answers to these questions (provided by coauthor Geoffrey Corn in his capacity as a
defense expert) were discussed at length during the presentation of evidence in the
trial and heavily relied on by the Gotovina defense in its summation."o' Because they
offer valuable insight into the targeting process writ large, they are reproduced below
in edited form in an effort to explore how the LOAC applies to the selection and
execution of targets, so as to simultaneously advance the commander's operational
objectives while fulfilling the LOAC's humanitarian objective of minimizing civilian
suffering produced by the use of fires in populated areas.
A.
1.

Eight Questions on the LOAC and Military Operations
Explain the symmetry between the law of armed conflict and the
operational art.

The LOAC-the body of customary and positive international law that
regulates both the authority to engage in armed conflict and the manner in which
parties conduct armed hostilities-arises from a desire among civilized nations to
prevent unnecessary suffering and confine the destruction of combat to the
participating armed belligerents, while at the same time not impeding the parties'
ability to effectively wage war. At its heart, the LOAC evolved from codes of
conduct imposed on belligerents by their commanders and has always reflected the
While it is clear that the law serves important
core logic of military operations.
humanitarian objectives, it is equally true that the law does so while facilitating the
ability of belligerents to accomplish their strategic, operational, and tactical
objectives. As a result, the contemporary LOAC reflects a carefully evolved balance
between these two interests, a balance informed by the realities of armed conflict.
This balance is manifest in numerous provisions of the customary and
conventional LOAC. Examples include the principle of military necessity,"' military
objective,'" proportionality,"o and the authority to preventively detain enemy
belligerents."' Even humanitarian obligations serve an underlying military utilitarian
purpose. These protections are derived from the reasoned judgment of the

105. Transcript of Prosecutor v. Gotovina at 21156-90, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90-T (Sept. 7, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/trans/en/090907ED.htm.
106. Id.
107. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 26-37 (3d ed. 2008)
(describing "the history and sources of the law of armed conflict").
108. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 10 ("The principle of military necessity
authorizes that use of force required to accomplish the mission.").
109. See Additional Protocol 1, supra note 15, art. 52(2) ("Attacks shall be limited strictly to military
objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.").
110. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
111. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316. 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW].
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profession-of-arms that unnecessary violence, destruction, and suffering will not only
waste limited and valuable resources, but will also ultimately undermine the strategic
purpose of armed conflict: restoration of peace.
The fact that the law serves the interests of not only civilians and noncombatants but also of belligerents is often overlooked in contemporary scholarship
and commentary. However, this purpose is clearly central to the law. The following
extract from one of the most important precursors to the twentieth-century evolution
of the conventional laws of war-the Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on Landemphasizes this aspect of the law:
By [codifying the rules of war derived from State practice], [it is] a service
to military men themselves.. .. A positive set of rules ... serves the
interests of belligerents and is far from hindering them, since by preventing
the unchaining of passion and savage instincts-which battle always
awakens, as much as it awakens courage and manly virtues-it strengthens
the discipline which is the strength of armies; it also ennobles their
patriotic mission in the eyes of the soldiers by keeping them within the
limits of respect due to the rights of humanity."2
The compelling logic reflected in this extract finds contemporary manifestation
in the policy mandates that the United States' and other nations' armed forces have
implemented to extend application of these principles to all military operations.113
These mandates indicate that the application of combat power must always be
subject to a logical and effective regulatory framework. That framework is provided
by the LOAC.
The LOAC is replete with examples of the symmetry between regulation and
operational logic. A quintessential example is the prohibition against the infliction of
superfluous or unnecessary suffering."4 This prohibition is a foundational principle
of the law, tracing its roots back to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868."' By
prohibiting the calculated infliction of superfluous suffering or injury, the principle
advances not only a humanitarian purpose, but also the military logic reflected in the
concept of economy of force. There is no military value in wasting resources for the
purpose of exacerbating the suffering of an opponent already rendered combat
ineffective; the principle of law is consistent with this logic.

112. OXFORD MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND preface (1880), available at http://www.icrc
.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/140?OpenDocument.
113. It is the policy of the United States that all "[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with
the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military
operations." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM para. 4.1 (2006).
114. Int'l Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Mar. 2005, rule
70, available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vlrul-rule70 [hereinafter Rule 70] ("The use
of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering is prohibited."); OXFORD MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND, supra note 112, art. 9(a)
("It is forbidden [t]o employ arms, projectiles, or materials of any kind calculated to cause superfluous
suffering, or to aggravate wounds. . . .").
115. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (stating as its object the barring of the "employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable").
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Another example is the law of military objective. While there may be
definitional uncertainty on the fringes of the rule when it is operationally applied, the
underlying premise is militarily sound: the application of combat power should be
limited only to those persons, places, or things that contribute to the achievement of
operational objectives. This rule is consistent with the logic that a resourceconscience commander should instinctively avoid wasting resources on targets of no
operational or tactical significance.
This general symmetry is unsurprising considering that the contemporary
LOAC has been historically informed by the reasoned judgments of battlefield
veterans and not in a vacuum. This symmetry is also a critical component in
enhancing compliance with the law. Because armed forces will be primarily
responsible for effective implementation of the law, implementation will invariably
be facilitated where the dictates of the law comport with the logic of the professionof-arms.
2.

What is the relationship between targets and "effects," and between targets
and the LOAC definition of military objective?

In general terms, targets are those persons, places, or things made the object of
attack by a military force."' Targets can include virtually any person, object, or place
in the battle space. While pursuant to the LOAC many persons, places, or things are
presumed not to be targetable,"' virtually no presumption of immunity is conclusive.
Even civilians can become lawful objects of attack by virtue of their direct
Likewise, the LOAC permits the targeting of
participation in hostilities."'
presumptively immune places, such as hospitals, when the enemy is using those
places for hostile (unlawful) purposes."9
The principle of distinction, which requires belligerents to distinguish between
lawful objects of attack and civilians and civilian property, is a basic principle of the
LOAC."2 This principle is derived from the concept of military necessity, which
permits the infliction of death and destruction only to the extent necessary to bring
about the prompt submission of enemy forces.12 ' Because the law presumes that the
deliberate infliction of death or destruction to civilians or civilian property does not
contribute to this objective, belligerents are obligated to refrain from making
civilians or civilian property the object of attack.
The LOAC defines those targets that may be lawfully attacked through the rule
of military objective and the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks.'22 Commanders

116. For a full definition and discussion of targets and the targeting process, see supra Part III.A.
117. See, e.g., Additional Protocol 1, supra note 15, arts. 50(1), 51(1) (stating that the civilian
population "shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations" and that "[i]n
case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian").
118. Id. art. 51(3).
119. Id. art. 52(2)-(3).
120. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 11-12.
121. Id. at 10-11.
122. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51(4), 52(2). See generally OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 10-12, 19-20 (discussing the law of war limitations on military objectives
and military necessity); INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR.
& SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 131-43 (2011) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK]
(explaining and analyzing Additional Protocol I articles 51 and 52).
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are obligated to select only lawful targets and to engage those targets in a manner
that comports with the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks. This does not,
however, mean that the knowing infliction of harm on civilians or civilian property
renders an attack on a target unlawful. Instead, it is the rule of military objective
that provides the prima facie standard for determining when a target is lawful. The
knowing but unavoidable harm to civilians or civilian property is considered as a
second level of analysis in order to determine whether the attack will be
indiscriminate and therefore unlawful.' 23 This assessment process occurs within the
targeting process. 114
In order to facilitate compliance with this basic principle of distinction, the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Additional Protocol I)
explicitly defines what qualifies as a military objective (those people, places, and
things that may be made the lawful objects of attack).125 The first component of this
definition is derived from Article 51, which provides that the "civilian population as
such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." 2 6 Because
individuals entitled to status as prisoners of war upon capture are excluded from the
definition of "civilian" (with the exception of civilians who accompany the armed
forces in the field), these "combatants" are by implication always lawful objects of
attack.127 In contrast, Additional Protocol I does not provide a comprehensive
definition of places and/or things that qualify as lawful objects of attack. This was
responsive to the inevitable variables of any military action, which make it impossible
to establish an exhaustive list of places and things that so qualify. 128 Instead,
Additional Protocol I provides a framework for assessing each proposed target to
determine if it so qualifies. That rule is Article 52, which provides "military
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage."' 29
Accordingly, determining whether places or things qualify as lawful objects of
attack requires a case-by-case analysis based on the mission, enemy, troops available,
terrain, time, and presence of civilians. A central component of this analysis is the
complementary rule established in Article 51, which provides that "[t]he presence or
movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to
render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in
attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede

123. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 12 (discussing the principle of
proportionality); LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 122, at 140-41 ("The question is whether such
death, injury, and destruction are excessive in relation to the military advantage; not whether any death,
injury or destruction will occur.").
124.

OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 12.

125. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51-52.
126. Id. art. 51(2).
127. See GPW, supra note 111, art. 4 (defining prisoners of war); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GC] (defining persons protected by the convention).
128. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, art. 52 (1987) [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I Commentary].
129. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 52.
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military operations."'" Pursuant to this rule, the presence of civilians in or around
what qualifies as a military objective does not "immunize" the thing or area from
attack. Instead, the operational decision-maker is obligated to conduct a secondary
analysis of the legality of the attack based on the prohibition against engaging in
indiscriminate attacks. This requires assessment of whether the anticipated harm to
civilians or civilian property will be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated (commonly referred to as proportionality analysis and
discussed in greater detail below).
Perhaps the three most important aspects of the military objective "test" are
contained in the prong of the rule limiting attacks to objects "whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage."'31 First, it is clear that the law recognizes that the
desired effect of an attack need not be total destruction. This is consistent with
principles of military operations. Commanders employ combat power to achieve
desired effects, and these effects often do not require total destruction or capture of
an enemy capability. For example, a doctrinal mission employing indirect fire assets
serves the purpose of not only target destruction, but also disruption, harassment,
and degradation. Another example would involve the use of a minefield to deny
access or egress to an enemy. If the use of the mines never results in the destruction
of an enemy asset, the effect may be achieved nonetheless by depriving the enemy of
a certain area.
Second, operational judgments must be made (and ultimately critiqued) based
on the situation prevailing at the time of the decision. The purpose of this
qualification is to prevent the "slippery slope" that would exist if commanders could
speculate on the potential future value of proposed targets. This does not, of course,
mean that anticipated value is not permissible. However, a commander must have
some basis in fact to support the conclusion that a possible future use of a place or
thing renders it as a present military objective.
Third, the advantage gained by targeting a place or thing must be "definite."
Again, the purpose of this qualifier is to prevent unfounded speculation or conjecture
However, no
of the value that targeting a place or thing would produce.'32
commander can know with absolute certainty the value to be gained from attacking a
target. What the "definite" qualifier is intended to prevent is general speculation on
some attenuated value of target engagement.'33 So long as the commander acts with
a good-faith belief that the target engagement will produce a tangible operational or
tactical advantage for his force, the qualifier is satisfied.
The second and third components of the military objective test are further
examples of the symmetry between the LOAC and military logic. No commander
should waste resources on targets with purely speculative value. Accordingly, sound
operational judgments should be consistent with these aspects of the military
objective test.

130. Id. art. 51(7).
131. Id. art. 52(2).
132. See Additional Protocol I Commentary, supra note 128, art. 52, para. 2024 ("[I]t is not legitimate
to launch an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages. Those ordering or executing
the attack must have sufficient information .....
133. Id.
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What is the relationship between the LOAC principle of distinction, the
definition of military objective, and the effect of an opponent locating
military objectives among or in proximity to civilians or civilian objects?

It is clear that military objectives may be lawfully targeted and that civilians
may not. The principle of distinction establishes this axiom. This principle, which is
at the core of the regulation of methods and means of warfare, requires that
belligerents must at all times distinguish between the lawful objects of attack and all
other persons, places, and things that do not qualify as such.134 As discussed above,
the rule of military objective implements this principle.
Compliance with the principle of distinction becomes most difficult when lawful
military objectives are comingled with civilians or civilian property. While the
LOAC imposes an obligation on belligerents to take "constant care... to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects,""' it is clear from both historical
practice and the structure of Additional Protocol I that such comingling is virtually
inevitable. Extending the obligation to mitigate risk to civilians by a prohibition
against attacks on military objectives whenever civilians or civilian objects are in
close proximity to these objectives would be unworkable for a number of reasons.
First, the rule would invite violation due to the reality that belligerents have
historically refused to consider military objectives immune from attack due to the
proximity of civilians or civilian property. Second, belligerents would be provided an
incentive to exacerbate the risk to civilians or civilian objects by deliberately
comingling them with military objectives in an effort to immunize those objectives.
In response to the reality of a comingled battle space, the drafters of Additional
Protocol I adopted a compromise approach. Belligerents bear a constant obligation
to mitigate the risk of harm to civilians and civilian property.'3 6 However, Article 51
explicitly provides that the presence of civilians or civilian objects in the proximity of
3
military objectives does not immunize those objectives from attack.' Of course, this
does not permit the deliberate targeting of civilians or civilian objects, but it does
permit attacks on lawful military objectives with knowledge that the attacks will
likely cause harm to civilians or civilian property. Thus, the commander does not
violate the LOAC when he orders an attack with knowledge that civilians will likely
become casualties of the attack, so long as he does not act with the purpose
(conscious objective) to cause such casualties.
An equally critical aspect of this balance is that the obligation to "take constant
care" to spare civilians and civilian objects from the harmful effects of hostilities
requires belligerents to make prima facie good-faith efforts not to comingle military
objectives with civilians or civilian property. 3 8 This obligation is obviously an
"endeavor" obligation, and is therefore not absolute. However, a belligerent who
deliberately locates military objectives in proximity to civilians or civilian objects

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 11.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 57(1).
Id.
Id. art. 51(7).
Id. art. 57.
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shares responsibility for the harm caused to civilians resulting from an attack on
those military objectives.'39
The final aspect of this equation is the relationship between comingled civilians
and the proportionality rule. All belligerents are prohibited from attempting to
immunize a military objective by deliberately locating the objective in the vicinity of
civilians or civilian property. However, even deliberate comingling (in violation of
the law) does not release the attacking commander from the obligation to consider
whether the harm to the civilians or civilian property would violate the
proportionality prong of the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks.'40 As a result,
when improper, comingling of civilians with military objectives provides a potential
residual immunizing effect. This is because it will result in a prohibition against
attacking the military objective if the harm to civilians is expected to be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. However,
excluding such situations from the scope of the proportionality rule would be both
unworkable (due to an attacking commander's inability to determine whether the
comingling was deliberate, reckless, negligent, or innocent) and would subject
civilians to the manipulation of commanders acting in bad faith.
In summary, when a commander identifies a lawful military objective that is
comingled with civilians or civilian property, the commander is permitted to attack
that objective even with knowledge that the attack will cause collateral damage or
incidental injury to civilians or civilian property. The only limitation on this
permission is that the commander must refrain from the attack if he determines that
the collateral damage or incidental injury will be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct advantage anticipated from the attack.
4.

How does the LOAC principle of proportionality seek to protect civilians
from the effects of attacks during the execution of combat operations?

As noted above, the presence of civilians and civilian property in areas of armed
hostilities has produced an ever-increasing risk that the effects of combat operations
will extend beyond lawful military objectives and impact these civilians and their
property. Because of this reality, it is universally recognized that the principle of
military objective is insufficient to provide adequate protection for civilians from the
harmful effects of hostilities. During the twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of
civilians became victims of war not as the result of a decision to deliberately target
them, but as the result of the collateral effects of attacks on lawful military
objectives. 141
Responding to this reality, the drafters of Additional Protocol I provided the
first express prohibition against launching indiscriminate attacks. Article 51 provides
a three-part definition of indiscriminate attacks: those that employ methods or
means of warfare that cannot be controlled; those that treat a number of military
objectives in an area of civilian population as one general objective; and those in
which the collateral damage or incidental injury will be excessive in relation to the

139. Id. arts. 57(7), 58; Additional Protocol I Commentary, supra note 128, art. 58, paras. 2240, 2244.
140. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51(5)(b), 51(8).
141. See Additional Protocol I Commentary, supra note 128, art. 51, para. 1968 (describing World
War II carpet bombing).
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concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from attacking a lawful military

objective. 1 42
This last prong of the indiscriminate attack definition is routinely referred to as
the "proportionality" rule, or the "principle of proportionality." It is universally
accepted as a customary norm of the jus in bello, applicable to all armed conflicts.
However, the term "proportionality" is somewhat misleading, for an attack does not
become indiscriminate when the collateral damage or incidental injury is slightly
greater than the military advantage anticipated (what is suggested by the term
"disproportionate") but only when those effects are excessive.
Understanding of this rule is facilitated by analogy to the common law concept
of malice in relation to the crime of murder. The crime of murder is contingent on
proof that a defendant killed with malice.'" Malice was originally understood as a
willful or deliberate act."' However, the common law evolved to define malice as
either express or implied.'4 6 Express malice is established when a defendant acts
deliberately (with the conscious objective to kill) or with knowledge of substantial
certainty that his act will cause a death.'47 Implied malice, however, is established
when the defendant acts without intent to kill but creates a risk to human life that is
so unjustified that it manifests a wanton disregard for the value of human life."" This
wanton disregard is sufficient to impute malice to the defendant."'
While this equation is not totally apposite to targeting decisions, there is a
useful analogy. Violation of the principle of military objective is analogous to acting
with express malice, for the commander is deliberately (intentionally) causing harm
to civilians or civilian property. A commander is not prohibited from attacking a
lawful military objective with knowledge of substantial certainty that the attack will
cause civilian casualties so long as there is no conscious objective to do so, so in this
regard the analogy fails. However, just as the common law allows for the imputation
of malice to a defendant who acts with no intent to kill when the defendant's actions
manifest a wanton disregard for others as the result of the risk created, the
proportionality rule imputes an improper purpose to an otherwise lawful attack
based not on the commander's intent, but instead on the commander's disregard for
the consequences of the risk created by the attack. When a commander launches
such an attack with awareness that the unintended harm to civilians will be excessive
in relation to the benefit of creating the risk (achieving the military objective), the
law essentially imputes to the commander the intent to engage in an indiscriminate
attack.
Because this rule is primarily regulatory and not punitive, it necessarily requires
commanders to balance anticipated effects of an attack. The two critical components
of this balance are the anticipated military advantage to be gained by attacking a
lawful target, and the anticipated collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 51(4)-(5).
Id. art. 51(5)(b).
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 543 (4th ed. 2006).

Id. at 547.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 548-49. See generally id. at 130 (discussing the meaning of intent in criminal law).
Id. at 552-54.
Id. at 554.
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and civilian property. There are no established numerical equations or ratios for
applying this rule, which is by its very nature METT-TC dependent on a case-by-case
basis. METT-TC refers to considerations of Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather,
Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations.o50 Any
critique of application of this rule must be based on this reality and must therefore be
made through the subjective perspective of the commander at the time the targeting
decision was made. All facts and circumstances available to the commander,
including the pressures of time and the proverbial "fog of war," must be considered
when rendering an objective assessment of the validity of a targeting decision.
Ultimately, like virtually all other regulatory provisions of the LOAC, these
rules are intended to reinforce the obligation of commanders to make decisions in
good faith. No commander should endanger civilians when the military advantage
gained by doing so is so insignificant as to render the harm to civilians excessive.
Doing so is both an act of bad faith and operationally illogical (for it presupposes a
conclusion that the advantage anticipated by the attack is negligible). What a
violation of this rule reveals, and accordingly requires, is the conclusion that although
a commander did not act with the purpose to harm civilians, his disregard for the
effects of his attack in relation to the advantage he anticipates justifies an imputation
of invalidity in his decision-making process. Thus, while commanders need not
always be correct in their judgments, they must always act reasonably under all the
circumstances.
5. Does the LOAC impose a per se prohibition against indirect fires in
populated areas?
There are very few per se LOAC prohibitions related to the use of weapons and
weapon systems during armed conflict. Some of these have taken the form of
treaties that establish an outright prohibition against the use of certain weapons, such
as the prohibition against the use of chemical, biological, and bacteriological

weapons. 1 Other prohibitions impose contextual limitations on the use of weapons
or methods of warfare, such as the prohibition of bombarding undefended

population areas or the use of booby traps in certain contexts.
There is no per se prohibition against the use of artillery to attack lawful
military objectives in populated areas. Instead, the legality of the use of this means
of warfare, like the use of almost all means of warfare, is determined by application
of the broad principles that regulate targeting (those discussed previously).
Accordingly, the legality of use of artillery in such areas is dependent on
consideration of a variety of factors related to the operational necessity for the use,
the availability of alternate methods and means of warfare to achieve the military
purpose, the enemy situation, and the risk to civilians. METT-TC is used in U.S.

practice to indicate the relevance of these variables in all operational decision

150. FM 3-0, supra note 11, para. 6-52.
151. Chemical Weapons Convention art. 1, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1, 1975,1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
152. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
(Protocol II) arts. 3-4, 1996, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168.
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making, and is a key component in assessing the propriety of use of artillery in
populated areas.'
Consideration of the METT-TC factors provides the contextual background for
operational decisions. While "law" is not an explicit element of this analysis, the
requirement to consider the civilian population and the enemy situation implicitly
invokes the LOAC in assessing the propriety of targeting decisions. An example of
the multiple factors a commander must assess in deciding whether to use artillery to
achieve an operational effect can be found in the U.S. Army Field Manual 6-20:
Any variable that could affect the mission is a factor. Before the
estimate is started, all relevant information must be collected from all available
sources. Once this information has been assembled and the factors that could
affect the plan have been identified, they should be listed and arranged in
priority.
Examples of the factors that may be considered are as follows:
* The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions.
* The availability of field artillery resources, including cannons, multiple
launch rocket systems (MLRSs), missiles, ammunition (conventional,
nuclear, and chemical), and target acquisition assets.
* The availability of other fire support resources, including mortars, NGF
[naval gunfire], tactical air support, and Army aviation support. Also
included are EW [electronic warfare] and other intelligence-controlled
surveillance assets.
* In the attack, the enemy dispositions (including frontage and depth), the
degree of protection afforded the enemy, objectives for subordinate forces
or units, the number of phases, and the likely frontage and depth of the
assault. These will affect the allocation of fire support resources to
subordinate units.
* In the defense, the mission of the security force, the frontage and depth of
the MBA [main battle area], the contingencies for counterattack, and
considerations for deep and rear [operations].
* The mobility of the supporting artillery and its speed of movement to
contact and withdrawal.
* In light forces, the force antiarmor plan.
* Courses open to the enemy artillery commander, especially his most
probable course of action. These are derived from the intelligence estimate
and knowledge of enemy artillery doctrine. Consideration of this factor
results in* The probable enemy artillery plan.
* Enemy artillery vulnerabilities.
* Enemy nuclear and chemical capability and posture.

153. See FM 3-0, supra note 11, para. 1-45 (explaining how leaders use METT-TC to analyze each
mission they receive).
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* Any information requirements on enemy that have significant
influence on the tasking of weapons-locating sensors.
* The allocation of resources, weapons, and munitions for counter
fire.
* Measures to reduce the vulnerability of our force.
* The recommended counter fire priorities for each phase of the
battle (by the designation of critical friendly zones and enemy
weapon systems).
* The enemy EW situation.
* The identification of high-payoff targets (derived from target value
analysis [TVA] and IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield]).
* The commander's
intelligence estimate).

information

requirements

(derived

from

the

* The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas.
This leads to the coordination of movement and position areas with the
operations staff.
* Ammunition consumption factors (type and quantity), pre-positioning
requirements, and priority of combat service support.
* The effects of survey and met requirements on the ability to guarantee
timely and accurate fire support (to include weapon and target acquisition
assets).
* The reliability and range of communications.
* The time required for positioning and technical preparation to engage
targets.
* The time to be ready to support the operation.'5 4
Use of artillery in populated areas should be dictated by assessment of these
factors, and even when the acronym is not explicitly used by a commander (for
example, in an army that does not tend to follow U.S. or NATO doctrine), these
considerations should inevitably be part of the targeting analysis. The commander
first must determine how the mission should be tactically executed, which will drive
selection of targets and dictate the effects that must be achieved for each target. The
commander then must assess the enemy situation to guide analysis of which
component of his power will be most effective in achieving the desired effects. The
commander will then assess the assets available that are capable of achieving the
effects, the effectiveness of each asset for this purpose, other demands on each asset,
etc. This is often called "weaponeering" and involves the process of selecting the

154.

U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-20, FIRE SUPPORT IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE 3-10 to -

12 (1988) [hereinafter FM 6-20].
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best asset for each proposed target."' The commander must then consider the
element of time, for time might make some assets that are potentially effective in an
attack non-responsive to the operational need.
Finally, the commander must assess the impact of the targeting decision on the
civilian population and civilian property. First, the commander must ensure the
desired effect can be achieved without violating the prohibition against
indiscriminate attacks. If the commander determines that artillery can be employed
in a manner that is not indiscriminate, then, so long as the object of attack is lawful,
the commander must then consider whether the potential harm to civilians creates an
unacceptable policy risk even if lawful. It is not uncommon in contemporary
operations for commanders to refrain from launching lawful attacks based on policydriven concerns (it simply might not be worth the cost of having to defend the
legality of the attack in the public realm, or a commander may not want to alienate
the civilian population by causing casualties that, while lawful, would still be
perceived as unjustified). However, this consideration is directly linked to the first
element of the analysis-the mission-because the mission will dictate the degree of
risk of public condemnation of civilian alienation a commander is willing to assume.
While the contemporary practice of U.S. and NATO forces is to place ROE
controls on the use of artillery in populated areas, it is simply improper to
characterize these controls as indications of per se prohibitions against such use.
Indeed, if this were the case, no ROE constraint would be necessary, for the restraint
would be redundant with existing legal prohibition. Furthermore, almost all such
ROE controls permit the use of artillery fires under certain circumstances or when
authorized by a certain level of command, which is only permissible because (and
when) such use is consistent with existing legal standards. For example, a prohibition
against the use of unobserved indirect fires in populated areas will often provide an
exception for "forces in contact" or permit such fires when authorized by "division
command or higher.",1 6 The variety of control measures is not relevant. What is
relevant is that by providing exceptions to these policy-based constraints, ROE
indicate that such fires are not prohibited per se by the LOAC, but are instead
dictated by METT-TC considerations.
If a commander decides to employ artillery against military objectives in
civilian-populated areas, the commander must act consistently with the obligation to
endeavor to minimize the risk to civilians. This will often involve considering the use
of artillery observers or "spotters" to better control the effects of the attack. This is
referred to as "observed" indirect fires, which obviously mitigates the risk of
collateral damage or incidental injury to civilians."' Unobserved indirect fires use
intelligence indicating the location of proposed targets and indirect fire direction
calculations to maximize the probability of achieving the desired effect."' Observed

155. JP 1-02, supra note 7, at 387.
156. See CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 93, at B-15-18 (providing a sample
ROE with language regarding exceptions for the use of unobserved indirect fires in populated areas).
157. FM 6-20, supra note 154, at 2-8.
158. Id. at 2-8 to -9 (There are two categories of fires: observed and unobserved. Adjusting and
correcting artillery fires by direct observation increases the effectiveness of artillery. Fires may be
delivered on unobserved targets when the relative location of such targets with respect to the unit firing
can be determined.). See FM 6-40 for a detailed description of firing methods. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY,
FIELD MANUAL 6-40, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR FIELD ARTILLERY MANUAL
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fires are therefore also operationally preferable because they enhance the
effectiveness of the artillery attack.
However, it is not always possible to use observed indirect fires. Observation
requires getting personnel into a position where they can have "eyes on" the target.
Because one of the key advantages of artillery is the capability to engage in long
range targeting, commanders might not be willing or even able to place friendly
spotters in close proximity to long range targets, especially those in areas under
significant enemy control. Ultimately, commanders will have to engage in a costbenefit analysis to decide whether placing artillery spotters in a position enabling
observed fires is the best operational decision.
A per se prohibition on unobserved fires would be wholly unworkable for two
reasons. First, it would encourage belligerents to put their most important targets in
populated areas, thereby increasing the danger to the civilian population. Second, it
would require attacking commanders to either ignore such targets (giving an enemy a
reward for comingling them), or resorting to ground assaults to attack such targets.
Because ground assaults in populated areas are considered the most complex and
dangerous type of ground operations, this will place commanders in an untenable
position of having to assume maximum risk to friendly forces whenever an enemy
chose to abuse the law by comingling important targets in civilian-populated areas.
Accordingly, there is no prohibition against using artillery, either observed or
unobserved, against lawful military objectives in civilian-populated areas. The
legality of such use must be assessed on a case-by-case basis that focuses on METTTC.
6.

Does a commander have an obligation to select a method or means of
warfare that poses the least risk to the civilian population? If so, what is the
impact of risk to his own forces when in the selection process?

Additional Protocol I's effort to mitigate the risk to civilians in areas of
hostilities includes a rule that imposes on commanders planning an attack the
obligation to place a high priority on this mitigation when selecting how they will
conduct attacks.' This rule, contained in Article 57, applies whenever a commander
has the option to select from more than one military objective or more than one
method or means of attack to achieve a tactical objective.' When this is the case,
the law requires a commander to select the objective or the method or means of
warfare that poses the least risk to the civilian population."' However, this rule
includes an important and pragmatic qualifier: the alternate options must be equally
effective for achieving the commander's purpose.'62 in essence, the rule is that "when
all options are equal in anticipated effect, select the option that creates the least risk
to the civilian population."
It is critical, however, to understand what the concept of "equality" means in
assessing multiple options. It is not merely an effects-based analysis. Instead, a
commander may legitimately consider both resource availability and risk to friendly
CANNON
159.
160.
161.
162.

GUNNERY (1996).
Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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forces when assessing equality.16 3 For example, a commander is not automatically
obligated to use precision guided munitions (PGM) in lieu of a "dumb" round when
attacking an area in which civilians are located. While the PGM will almost certainly
be the option that reduces the risk to the civilian population, the commander is
entitled to consider the supply of PGMs compared to dumb munitions, other military
objectives that might require the use of the limited number of PGMs, and resupply
rates. If the commander determines that it is operationally necessary to "husband"
the PGMs, then the option to use PGMs is not "equal" to the option to use the dumb
rounds.
One area of controversy in application of this rule is the effect of risk to friendly
forces when conducting equality analysis. Most experts seem to agree that a
commander is entitled (some would argue obligated) to consider the comparative
Accordingly, the
risk to friendly forces as a component of this analysis.'"
commander is not obligated to select the method or means of warfare that poses the
least risk of harmful effects to civilians when that choice increases the risk to his own
forces. For example, a commander might have a need to destroy or disable an enemy
command post located in a populated area. When assessing the possible options to
achieve this objective, the commander may have a choice between indirect artillery
fires or a special operations assault on the objective. Because the special operations
assault will reduce the risk to civilians as the result of the more precise engagement
probability, from an effects standpoint it would appear to be the option the
commander is obligated to adopt. However, because use of that option will pose a
substantially greater risk of casualties to his forces, that option is not equal to the use
of indirect fires within the meaning of the rule.
Of course, commanders may always choose to assume greater risk in the
interest of minimizing harm to civilians as a matter of policy because the benefit is
perceived as outweighing the risk to friendly forces (which is often a motivating
factor in the imposition of constraints within rules of engagement that are more
restrictive than required by the LOAC). However, such choices are not legally
mandated.
a.

Should commanders seek to avoid ground combat operations in
civilian population centers?

It is a maxim of operational art that urban warfare'6 1 should be avoided
whenever feasible. This is because engaging an enemy in built-up or urban terrain is
considered among the most difficult combat situations a commander may encounter.
Such operations cede to the defender the natural advantage provided by the use of
the urban terrain for cover, concealment, and overall tactical advantage. The builtup environment degrades the effectiveness of fires and maneuver. It also creates an

163. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 140-43 (2d ed. 2010).
164. Id. at 141-43.
165. FIBUA (fighting in built-up areas) is the current doctrinal term for conducting ground combat
operations in built-up or urban areas. This type of operation is also often referred to as MOUT (military
operations in urban terrain). U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-21.10, THE INFANTRY RIFLE
COMPANY Glossary-2 (2006) (defining FIBUA); FM 6-20, supra note 154, Glossary-7 (defining MOUT).
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extremely high risk to civilians in area of hostilities that adds an undesired element of
uncertainty into the target engagement process.
History is replete with examples from which this maxim is derived. From
Stalingrad to Hue to Fallujah, urban areas have historically been considered the most
undesired terrain on which to engage an enemy with ground combat power. 6
Because of this, military doctrine indicates that whenever feasible, commanders
should seek to isolate and bypass enemy defensive positions in built-up areas."
Unfortunately, there is an inverse relationship between built-up areas and
defensive operations. Because of the difficulty of dislodging forces from such areas,
a defending commander obtains a force multiplication benefit from emplacing
positions in them.
Bypassing built-up areas is not always feasible and, when absolutely necessary,
assault into such areas may have to occur. However, if alternatives to ground assault
are viable, a commander would be derelict in not considering and ultimately
employing them. For example, a commander may choose to use indirect fire assets
to disrupt enemy forces in a built-up area during bypass operations, or to fix them in
the area so that they cannot endanger friendly forces during the bypass.
The danger associated with ground assaults into built-up areas would also be an
important METT-TC consideration in deciding how to address the presence of
enemy forces in such an area.
b. Does the LOAC prohibit the use of certain weapons against targets in
areas of civilian population?
Other than weapon systems that are the subject of express treaty prohibitions
(such as chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons, air-delivered incendiary
weapons, etc.), all weapons are potentially lawfully used in populated areas, and all
weapons are potentially unlawful for such use. Whether use of a weapon in such an
area is lawful is contingent on two primary rules. First, the weapons must be used
against a lawful military objective; using even the most precise engagement capability
against a non-military objective is unlawful. Second, the weapon itself, or its
employment, must not be indiscriminate.
The prohibition against indiscriminate attacks codified in Article 51 of
Additional Protocol I includes both weapon types (means) and weapon employment
(methods).'" Use of a weapon that cannot be controlled once fired is treated as
indiscriminate because the weapon is not subject to sufficient control to comply with
the distinction obligation. Weapons that fall into this category would include gas or
chemical weapons or long-range missiles that can be directed against a populated
area but not against any target contained therein (such as the Iraqi SCUD missile
attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia in the 1991 Persian Gulf War). Most modern
weapons however, including most tube and rocket artillery, are subject to enough fire
direction control as to not be considered to fall within this category.

166.
to offset
167.
168.

See FM 3-0, supra note 11, para. 1-18 (recognizing that adversaries will seek urban environments
U.S. advantages).
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-06, JoINT URBAN OPERATIONS 1-10 (2009).
Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 51.
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Any weapon can also be employed in a manner that is inherently indiscriminate.
This is reflected in the two additional definitions of indiscriminate attack in Article
51. The first involves treating a number of distinct military objectives in a populated
area as one large objective for purposes of targeting.'69 When a commander employs
a weapon system to attack a "lumped together" series of distinct targets (such as
carpet bombing a city in order to destroy dispersed military objectives within the
city), that employment is indiscriminate and is prohibited. The second is the
proportionality rule discussed above. When a commander employs even a precise
weapon system against a lawful military objective with the anticipation that the
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians or civilian property will be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage the commander
expects to gain from the attack, the attack is treated as indiscriminate and therefore
unlawful.'
Because there is no per se prohibition against tube or rocket artillery, direct or
indirect artillery fires, observed or unobserved indirect artillery fires, or conventional
(non-chemical or bacteriological) artillery or rocket munitions, use of these
capabilities in populated areas is subject to a case-by-case legality assessment based
on the foregoing rules.
c.

Does the LOAC contain a per se prohibition against using rocket
systems to engage military objectives within urban areas during
offensive military operations?

Consistent with the foregoing discussion, the LOAC imposes no per se
prohibition against using rocket artillery (indirect fire systems that employ rockets,
such as the U.S. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or the Soviet-era 122
Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher used by Croatian forces against Knin) to engage
lawful military objectives in a civilian-populated area. As with almost all other
weapon systems, the legality of such use would be contingent on METT-TC analysis
in relation to the LOAC prohibition against engaging in indiscriminate attacks.
Once a commander determines that a military objective within a populated area
needs to be attacked, the commander must then determine the effects that must be
achieved. This "effects-based analysis" should drive the choice between available
assets to engage the objective. If the commander determines that long-range strike
capability is the best or only viable option, then artillery will become a prime
candidate for target engagement.
Artillery assets are generally divided between cannon and rocket. Cannon
artillery uses single-round munitions (such as howitzer or mortar rounds). Rocket
artillery fires rocket-propelled munitions, often in salvos of multiple rockets
(although it should be noted that tube artillery can be delivered in salvos from
multiple individual artillery assets). According to U.S. Army Field Manual 6-20, Fire
Support in the Airland Battle:

Indirect Fire. The projectile, rocket, missile, and bomb are the weapons of
indirect-fire systems. Indirect fire can cause casualties to troops, inhibit
169.
170.

Id. art. 51(5)(a).
Id. art. 51(5)(b).
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mobility, suppress or neutralize weapon systems, damage equipment and
installations, and demoralize the enemy. Most casualties to troops in an
indirect-fire attack are caused by the initial rounds. Best results are
achieved by a short engagement at a high rate from as many weapons as
possible.
Effects of Fire. A commander will decide what effect fire support must
have on a particular target. There are three types of fire: destruction,
171
neutralization, and suppression.
Rocket artillery is generally preferred for area targets. However, it is also an
ideal asset for use in disruption missions. For example, rocket artillery is often a
preferred means to disrupt enemy air defense assets or command and control
capabilities. Furthermore, the value of rocket artillery in relation to cannon artillery
will often turn on multiple factors in addition to the desired effect, to include the
vulnerability of enemy assets to both types of attack, degree of certainty as to
location of enemy assets, the collateral effects of both types of attack, and other
operational demands on these assets.172
Any commander considering use of rocket artillery in a civilian-populated area
would be required to assess the impact of anticipated collateral damage and
incidental injury. However, it is impermissibly overbroad to assert that use of this
asset would always be the most indiscriminate option of attack in comparison to
cannon artillery. Factors such as the location of the civilian population (indoors or
outdoors), the timing of the attack, the protection afforded to civilians by hardened
structures, and the potential comparative impact of cannon versus rocket rounds
would all be relevant in making this determination. It is certainly conceivable that
based on all these (and other METT-TC) considerations a commander could make a
good-faith determination that rocket artillery is better suited to achieve a desired
effect within the framework of the LOAC than cannon artillery.
7. What importance does evidence of good faith play in attempting to impute
improper motives to a commander when critiquing a given decision-making
process?
The LOAC rests ultimately on a foundation of good faith. Virtually any LOAC
rule can be circumvented by a commander who is not committed to good-faith
compliance with the law. When assessing criminal responsibility for LOAC
violations, it should be axiomatic that an overall record of good-faith application is
probative circumstantial evidence in relation to determining whether the decision
under judicial scrutiny violates the law.
Transforming the obligations related to the application of combat power to
criminal sanction is a complex process. The law regulating such application provides
operational leaders (the term "commander" denotes such leaders, although the
proscriptions of the law could also reach decision-makers in a non-command
position) a framework to guide their decision-making process. Reliance on these
171. FM 6-20, supra note 154, at 2-8.
172. JOHN J. MCGRATH, FIRE FOR EFFECT: FIELD ARTILLERY AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN THE
U.S. ARMY 133-35 (2010), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath
fire.pdf (describing the modernization of U.S. artillery and the improved capabilities of the MLRS).
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rules as the source of criminal sanction requires a retrospective critique of this
decision-making process. This involves the classic "subjective/objective" test: an
objective standard of assessment is applied by analyzing decisions through the
subjective perspective of the defendant. This is essential to ensure that commanders
are not held liable based on a retrospective assessment of facts and circumstances. It
is also an established principle of war crimes liability, often referred to as the
"Rendulic Rule" in reference to the war crimes prosecution of a German
commander for engaging in a "scorched earth" campaign in Norway during a tactical
retreat at the end of World War I."
Lothar Rendulic was ultimately acquitted by the Nuremberg war crimes
tribunal of the charge of wanton devastation for his "scorched earth" campaign."'
This precedent stands for the proposition that when subjecting a commander's
judgment to criminal critique it is necessary to consider the situation through the
perspective of that commander at the time the judgment was made."
Assessing criminal responsibility for operational decisions also invariably
involves assessing the state of mind of the defendant. Because direct evidence of
state of mind is rarely available, it becomes essential to rely on circumstantial
evidence to infer a defendant's state of mind related to a given decision. For
decisions to employ combat power, this evidence often takes the form of effects from
such employment. These effects are relied on to infer the defendant acted with a
criminal state of mind. However, because operational effects can often support the
alternate inference that a commander acted in good faith even if the assessment of
potential consequences was erroneous, prior decisions by the commander should also
be considered in the assessment process. In this regard, while not dispositive, a
pattern of good-faith decision making by a commander could undermine the
inference that an illicit effect was the result of a criminal state of mind.
This evidence is particularly useful in determining if a targeting decision violates
the proportionality rule. That rule, which is a component of the prohibition against
indiscriminate attack, prohibits any attack in which the anticipated incidental injury
or collateral damage is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated. Using this rule as a basis for criminal responsibility requires
the finder of fact to critique a command judgment based on effects of an attack and
assessment of information available to the commander at the time of the attack. As
will be discussed in more detail below, the essence of this inquiry is determining
whether bad faith can be imputed to the commander as the result of what is in
essence a reckless judgment producing harm to civilians and civilian property. In this
regard, the criminal application of the proportionality rule almost inevitably will
require the finder of fact to rely on actual effects of an attack as circumstantial
evidence from which to infer the defendant's state of mind at the time of the
decision. Accordingly, evidence of improper motive for creation of the risk should

173. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 11 ("The circumstances justifying destruction
of objects are those of military necessity, based upon information reasonably available to the commander
at the time of his decision.").
174. Id.
175. United States v. List (The Hostage Case), 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 1230, 1297 (1948) ("The conditions, as they
appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent
military necessity warranted the decision made.").
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be highly probative in the imputation analysis, and therefore evidence of overall
good-faith application of the law becomes probative to this motive analysis.
8. Does the LOAC permit a commander to assume subordinates will
implement orders lawfully?
The responsibility of military commanders for the LOAC violations of
subordinates is a complex and ever-evolving area of the law. The concept of
"command responsibility" is a doctrine of criminal liability that emerged in the
aftermath of World War II and continues to play a central role in contemporary war
crimes prosecutions."'
Pursuant to this doctrine, as a general proposition a commander can be held
criminally responsible for the LOAC violations of subordinates."' However, this
liability is not "strict," but requires that the commander acted with some culpable
state of mind."' Much of the debate related to application of this doctrine has
focused on what level of proof is necessary to satisfy this mens rea element,
particularly when liability is based not on what the commander knew, but what he
"should have known."179
However, as the doctrine has evolved, some aspects have emerged that provide
a degree of protection for military commanders. The most important of these is the
principle that commanders are generally justified in relying on a presumption that
subordinates will execute lawful orders in a lawful manner. This is an important
qualifier to the scope of command liability, for it recognizes that it is impossible for
commanders to monitor every action of every subordinate. Of course, such reliance
would be invalid if the commander was on notice of some reason why subordinates
would be inclined to disregard the law. 0 However, as the U.S. military tribunal
noted in the High Command case after World War II:
Military subordination is a comprehensive but not conclusive factor in
A high commander cannot keep
fixing criminal responsibility ....
completely informed of the details of military operations of
subordinates ... . He has the right to assume that details entrusted to
responsible subordinates will be legally executed.... There must be a
personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly
traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates
constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a
personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action
of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence. Any other interpretation
of International Law would go far beyond the basic principles of criminal
*181
law as known to civilized nations.

176. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 35; GREEN, supra note 107, at 309-10; GARY
D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 382-91 (2010) (summarizing the development of command
responsibility and the criminal liability it entails).
177. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 35.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 36.
181.
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Accordingly, when a commander gives orders to subordinate units, it is neither
necessary nor required that the orders explicitly direct subordinates to execute their
missions in accordance with the LOAC. Such a direction is an implicit component of
all orders. When a commander issues an order, therefore, he may justifiably
presume that the subordinate leaders who receive the order will resolve any
uncertainty as to the legality of the method of execution in favor of lawful conduct.
B. Use of Indirect Fires in Operation Storm
Operation Storm and General Gotovina's trial highlight the significance of
developing an operationally sound understanding of how the LOAC regulates the
application of combat power. As part of his offensive to capture the Krajina Serb
capital of Knin, General Gotovina ordered the employment of cannon (howitzer)
and rocket artillery against numerous targets in Knin."' These targets had been preselected based on intelligence analysis and ranged from barracks to headquarters
buildings to the residence of the President of the Krajina"' General Gotovina
obviously knew civilians and civilian property were at risk as a result of his use of
fires against these targets. Nonetheless, he ordered execution of the attack plan as
part of the broader mission to penetrate Serb defensive positions surrounding the
city, exploit these penetrations, defeat Serb resistance, and force Serb forces to
abandon their hold on the Krajina.
Unsurprisingly, the prosecution's position on why General Gotovina ordered
the use of fires against targets in Knin was substantially different from that of the
defense. For the prosecution, use of indirect fires in a city populated with Serbs
provided critical evidence of General Gotovina's illicit intent to ethnically cleanse
the region of the Serb civilian population; for the defense, the use was a legitimate
employment of combat power carefully conceived to set the conditions for success of
the main effort: penetration and exploitation of improved defensive positions.m
Why is this a significant example of the complexity created by the intersection
of LOAC regulation and operational art? Because like virtually any use of fires in a
densely populated area-an almost inevitable aspect of future armed conflicts-the
effects of Croat attacks provided evidence that both the prosecution and defense
argued proved their respective cases. For the prosecution, the fact that the fires
produced damage to civilian property and that Serb civilians fled the city
demonstrated an illicit purpose."' For the defense, the fact that the fires produced
exactly the type of command and control paralysis General Gotovina had intended,
coupled with the fact that the vast majority of damage was inflicted on or in close
proximity to lawful military objectives, undermined any reasonable allegation that

CRIMINALS 76 (1949).

182. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgement Volume I of II, supra note 34, paras. 1183-86.
183. Id. para. 1403.
184. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Prosecution's Public Redacted Final Trial Brief, supra note 8, para.
123 ("Gotovina planned, ordered and implemented... a shelling attack against the Krajina Serb
population designed to drive out Krajina Serbs.").
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General Gotovina's intent was to terrorize the civilian population."' In fact, the
defense asserted that, even though it had no burden to do so, it had proved by
overwhelming evidence General Gotovina's good-faith compliance with the
LOAC.
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber's judgment adopted almost all of the defense's
arguments. It found that there were numerous lawful enemy objectives located
within the Knin;' ' it rejected the prosecution's theory that the LOAC imposes a per
se prohibition against the use of indirect fires in populated areas-even unobserved
indirect fires;'90 it rejected the prosecution's theory that the use of rocket artillery in a
populated area is automatically indiscriminate; 9 1 it found that approximately 1,000
out of 1,057 artillery round impacted either a lawful military objective or an area
within a reasonable range of a lawful military objective.'92 However, based on the
approximate 57 impacts that it did not attribute to lawful objects of attack and its
conclusion that attacking President Milan Martic's residence with knowledge that
civilians might be harmed by the attack violated the LOAC proportionality principle,
the Trial Chamber found that General Gotovina's overall intent was to place the
entire city under artillery attack, and therefore the attack violated the LOAC.'
The finding of an illegal attack on Knin is a major aspect of General Gotovina's
currently pending appeal.'94 The ultimate resolution of this appeal will have a
potentially profound impact on the law of targeting precisely because the case
involved the type of factual and operational situation so common in modern warfare
(as opposed to an extreme case of blatant deliberate targeting of civilian
populations). Both NATO's air campaign against Libya and the U.S. practice of
using armed drones to attack terrorist targets of opportunity in the border regions of
Pakistan involve many of the same complex legal and operational issues reflected in
the Gotovina judgment.
Several aspects of the attack on Knin illustrate why it is so important to consider
operational art and the situation confronted by a commander to understand how the
LOAC influences decision-making. First, is it legitimate to use fires against targets in
populated areas with full knowledge that destroying the target is virtually
impossible? In Operation Storm, this was the situation with various targets attacked
with indirect fires-many of which were hardened structures in Knin.'95 In the
abstract, risking civilian injuries without the ability to destroy a target may seem
inherently invalid, a position asserted by the Prosecutor. However, unless the
intended effect is considered, and that effect is viewed in the context of the overall
operation, such a conclusion would be flawed. In Operation Storm, General
Gotovina never sought to destroy these buildings.' 9 Instead, he used his limited
indirect fire capability to disrupt enemy command, control, and communications by
187. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Gotovina Defence Final Trial Brief, supra note 8, paras. 181-82.
188. Id. paras. 183-88.
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193. Id. paras. 1890-913.
194. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ICTY Case No. IT-06-90-A, Notice of Appeal of Ante Gotovina, paras.
C-H (May 16, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom6/en/110516.pdf.
195. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgement Volume II of It, supra note 9, paras. 1890-913.
196. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Gotovina Defence Final Trial Brief, supra note 8, para. 262.
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targeting the buildings at critical times of the attack that he had launched on the
outskirts of the city. 19 7 Because it was never operationally necessary to destroy those
targets, indirect fires provided an ideal means of achieving this effect; an effect that
was absolutely critical to isolate forces in fixed defensive positions in order to
Thus, when
facilitate exploitation of any penetrations of those defenses.'
considered in this light, the reasonableness of the fires seems fundamentally
different, a conclusion that was not lost on the Trial Chamber.
A more complex illustration was the use of fires to attack the apartment
building where Milan Martic, the President of the Krajina Serbs, resided. How could
such an attack be legitimate? Martic was the civilian leader of the Krajina Serb
military forces and as such was a lawful object of attack."' As with his attacks on
other buildings in Knin, General Gotovina almost certainly did not expect to destroy
the apartment with intermittent shelling. Nor was it likely he expected to kill Martic,
although such an effect was possible. Instead, by using fires to harass Martic,
General Gotovina could have intended to "fix" him in the apartment location and
thereby isolate the military headquarters in Knin from its political leadership.2 00
When considered in a broader operational context, such an effect seems particularly
significant. This is because the Krajina Serbs relied on Serbia proper for almost all
their support, and Martic would have been the conduit between the Krajina and
President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia.20 1 Disrupting his ability to assess the
operational situation and communicate with Milosevic would therefore mitigate the
risk of Serbian intervention to reinforce their Krajina allies.
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber accepted the defense position that the apartment
qualified as a lawful object of attack because General Gotovina expected Martic to
be located there.2 0 However, the Chamber then concluded that because General
Gotovina knew civilians resided in that area, the attack was inherently
indiscriminate.2 03 This aspect of the judgment is a focal point of the pending appeal,2 0
and for good reason. Because the Trial Chamber failed to articulate its view of the
military value General Gotovina anticipated when he chose to attack the building
and failed to consider how disrupting Martic's ability to influence the battle would
impact overall operational execution, the judgment is difficult to understand. Such
considerations are essential to any proportionality judgment, whether made by a
commander prior to an attack or a tribunal after the attack. If this aspect of the
judgment is rejected on appeal, it will almost certainly be the result of this failure to
lay an operationally based foundation.
CONCLUSION
Targeting is a complex operational process that involves life and death
decisions. The LOAC plays a critical role in regulating that process. Whether a
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private with a rifle or a Predator drone firing a Hellfire missile, the legal framework
is the same. However, how that framework applies in any given situation will
inevitably be influenced by the nature of the military operation. It should therefore
be apparent that an understanding of operational art and the many variables that
influence a commander's targeting judgments is required to truly understand how the
LOAC regulates the application of combat power.
The recent case of Prosecutor v. Gotovina provides a unique insight into the
significance of the relationship between operational art and legal regulation. The
complexity of the targeting environment General Gotovina confronted during
Operation Storm is indicative of the complexities that will almost certainly permeate
future military operations. Building off of this case, this Article seeks to illustrate
why an understanding of that relationship is critical to a genuine understanding of
how the LOAC regulates combat operations, and aspects of operational art central
to this understanding. While the case against General Gotovina is yet to be finally
resolved, students of this law should pay close attention, for the issues Gotovina
raises are and will remain central to the legal regulation of all armed conflicts.

